July 1, 2021

To the Managements of all regulated financial institutions
and designated non-financial service providers

VMI/gcr/2.46 /INT/9712

Subject: FATF Public Statement on High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action / FATF Public Statement on Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring

Dear Management,

The purpose of this letter is to draw your urgent attention to:

a. FATF Public Statement on High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action of June 2021 (enclosure 1) and of February 21, 2020 (enclosure 2)

With regard to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Iran, the FATF calls on all members and urges all jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence, and in the most serious cases, countries are called upon to apply counter-measures to protect the international financial system from the ongoing money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing risks emanating from these countries.

b. FATF Public Statement on Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring of June 2021 (enclosure 3)

The FATF has identified Albania, Barbados, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cayman Islands, Haiti, Jamaica, Malta, Mauritius, Morocco, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Senegal, South Sudan, Syria, Uganda, Yemen and Zimbabwe as jurisdictions that have strategic AML/CFT deficiencies. The information included in enclosure 3 must be included in your risk analysis when conducting transactions with persons or companies established in these jurisdictions.

REQUIRED ACTIONS

The Centrale Bank van Aruba requires all regulated entities and designated non-financial service providers to take due notice of the information contained in the enclosures, as well as of the required follow-up actions that need to be taken.

Further details and the actions you must take are outlined in enclosure 4. The relevant regulatory framework is enclosed for your convenience (enclosure 5).

If you have any questions or comments regarding this letter, please contact Ms. Vasilena Ivanova, Policy Officer of the Integrity Supervision Department at telephone number (+297) 525-2214 or by email v.ivanova@ecbaruba.org.

Sincerely yours,

Centrale Bank van Aruba

Enclosures: 5

cc Head of the Financial Intelligence Unit
High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action - June 2021

High-risk jurisdictions have significant strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and financing of proliferation. For all countries identified as high-risk, the FATF calls on all members and urges all jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence, and, in the most serious cases, countries are called upon to apply countermeasures to protect the international financial system from the money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing (ML/FT/PF) risks emanating from the country. This list is often externally referred to as the “black list”. Since February 2020, in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, the FATF has paused the review process for countries in the list of High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action, given that they are already subject to the FATF’s call for countermeasures. Therefore, please refer to the statement on these jurisdictions adopted in February 2020. While the statement may not necessarily reflect the most recent status of Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s AMTI/CFT regimes, the FATF’s call for action on these high-risk jurisdictions remains in effect.

- High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action – 21 February 2020

More on:
- Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring
- Outcomes FATF Plenary 25 June 2021

(High-risk and other monitored jurisdictions)
High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action – 21 February 2020

High-risk jurisdictions have significant strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and financing of proliferation. For all countries identified as high-risk, the FATF calls on all members and urges all jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence, and in the most serious cases, countries are called upon to apply counter-measures to protect the international financial system from the ongoing money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing (ML/TF/PF) risks emanating from the country. This list is often externally referred to as the “black list”. *

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)

The FATF remains concerned by the DPRK’s failure to address the significant deficiencies in its anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime and the serious threats they pose to the integrity of the international financial system. The FATF urges the DPRK to immediately and meaningfully address its AML/CFT deficiencies. Further, the FATF has serious concerns with the threat posed by the DPRK’s illicit activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and its financing.

The FATF reaffirms its 25 February 2011 call on its members and urges all jurisdictions to advise their financial institutions to give special attention to business relationships and transactions with the DPRK, including DPRK companies, financial institutions, and those acting on their behalf. In addition to enhanced scrutiny, the FATF further calls on its members and urges all jurisdictions to apply effective counter-measures, and targeted financial sanctions in accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolutions, to protect their financial sectors from money laundering, financing of terrorism and WMD proliferation financing (ML/TF/PF) risks emanating from the DPRK. Jurisdictions should take necessary measures to close existing branches, subsidiaries and representative offices of DPRK banks within their territories and terminate correspondent relationships with DPRK banks, where required by relevant UNSC resolutions.

Iran

In June 2016, Iran committed to address its strategic deficiencies. Iran’s action plan expired in January 2018. In February 2020, the FATF noted Iran has not completed the action plan.[1]

In October 2019, the FATF called upon its members and urges all jurisdictions to: require increased supervisory examination for branches and subsidiaries of financial institutions based in Iran; introduce enhanced relevant reporting mechanisms or systematic reporting of financial transactions; and require increased external audit requirements for financial groups with respect to any of their branches and subsidiaries located in Iran.

Now, given Iran’s failure to enact the Palermo and Terrorist Financing Conventions in line with the FATF Standards, the FATF fully lifts the suspension of counter-measures and calls on its members and urges all jurisdictions to apply effective counter-measures, in line with Recommendation 19.[2]

Iran will remain on the FATF statement [High Risk Jurisdictions Subject to a Call for Action] until the full Action Plan has been completed. If Iran ratifies the Palermo and Terrorist Financing Conventions, in line with the FATF standards, the FATF will decide on next steps, including whether to suspend countermeasures. Until Iran implements the measures required to address the deficiencies identified with respect to countering terrorism-financing in the Action Plan, the FATF will remain concerned with the terrorist financing risk emanating from Iran and the threat this poses to the international financial system.

[1] In June 2016, the FATF welcomed Iran’s high-level political commitment to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, and its decision to seek technical assistance in the implementation of the Action Plan. Since 2016, Iran established a cash declaration regime, enacted amendments to its Counter-Terrorist Financing Act and its Anti-Money Laundering Act, and adopted an AML by-law.

In February 2020, the FATF noted that there are still items not completed and Iran should fully address: (1) adequately criminalizing terrorist financing, including by removing the exemption for designated groups “attempting to end foreign occupation, colonialism and racism”; (2) identifying and freezing terrorist assets in line with the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions; (3) ensuring an adequate and enforceable customer due diligence regime; (4) demonstrating how authorities are identifying and sanctioning unlicensed money/value transfer service providers; (5) ratifying and implementing the Palermo and TF Conventions and clarifying the capability to provide mutual legal assistance; and (6) ensuring that financial institutions verify that wire transfers contain complete originator and beneficiary information.

[2] Countries should be able to apply appropriate countermeasures when called upon to do so by the FATF. Countries should also be able to apply countermeasures independently of any call by the FATF to do so. Such countermeasures should be effective and proportionate to the risks.

The Interpretative Note to Recommendation 19 specifies examples of the countermeasures that could be undertaken by countries.

* This statement was previously called “Public Statement”
- Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring - February 2020
- Outcomes FATF Plenary Paris, 19-21 February 2020

High-risk and other monitored jurisdictions
Jurisdictions under increased monitoring are actively working with the FATF to address strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing. When the FATF places a jurisdiction under increased monitoring, it means the country has committed to resolve swiftly the identified strategic deficiencies within agreed timeframes and is subject to increased monitoring. This list is often externally referred to as the "grey list".

The FATF and FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs) continue to work with the jurisdictions below as they report on the progress achieved in addressing their strategic deficiencies. The FATF calls on these jurisdictions to complete their action plans expeditiously and within the agreed timeframes. The FATF welcomes their commitment and will closely monitor their progress. The FATF does not call for the application of enhanced due diligence measures to be applied to these jurisdictions, but encourages its members and all jurisdictions to take into account the information presented below in their risk analysis.

The FATF identifies additional jurisdictions, on an ongoing basis, that have strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing. A number of jurisdictions have not yet been reviewed by the FATF or their FSRBs, but will be in due course.

In October 2020, the FATF decided to recommence work, paused due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and to identify new countries with strategic AML/CFT deficiencies and prioritise the review of listed countries with expired or expiring deadlines of action plan items. The following countries had their progress reviewed by the FATF since February 2021: Albania, Barbados, Botswana, Cambodia, Cayman Islands, Ghana, Jamaica, Mauritius, Morocco, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. For these countries, updated statements are provided below. Burkina Faso and Senegal were given the opportunity and chose to defer reporting due to the pandemic; thus, the statements issued in February 2021 for these jurisdictions are included below, but may not necessarily reflect the most recent status of the jurisdiction's AML/CFT regime. Following review, the FATF now also identifies Haiti, Malta, Philippines, and South Sudan.

The FATF welcomes the progress made by these countries in combating money laundering and terrorist financing, despite the challenges posed by COVID-19.

Jurisdictions with strategic deficiencies

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Jurisdiction no longer subject to increased monitoring

Ghana
Albania

Since February 2020, Albania made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MONEYVAL to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Albania has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by implementing additional measures to address strategic deficiencies, such as:

1. Finalising a project to reduce the informal, cash-based economy and to register ownership of all real estate;
2. Improving the timely handling of mutual legal assistance requests;
3. Establishing more effective mechanisms to detect and prevent money laundering from ownership or controlling DNFBPs, including by strengthening competent authorities’ powers to apply sanctions; and
4. Demonstrating the continued use of asset seizes and freezing their confiscations for the proceeds of crime, especially assets linked to third-party and professional money launderers, as well as indirect proceeds and equivalent value.

Barbados

In February 2020, Barbados made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and CAFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Barbados should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address strategic deficiencies, including by:

1. Demonstrating an effective application of risk-based supervision for FIs and DNFBPs;
2. Taking appropriate measures to prevent money laundering and the financing of terrorism, and ensuring that the FIU receives promptly and on a timely basis all relevant and updated beneficial ownership information.

Botswana

In October 2013, Botswana made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. At its June 2021 plenary, the FATF made the initial determination that Botswana has substantially completed its action plan and warrants an on-site assessment to verify that implementation of Botswana’s AML/CFT reforms has begun and is being sustained, and that the necessary political commitment remains in place to sustain implementation in the future. Botswana has made the following key reforms, including:

1. Developing a comprehensive national AML/CFT strategy and policy informed by national risk assessment results;
2. Developing risk-based supervision and monitoring programmes and (4) improving the dissemination and use of financial intelligence by the FIU and others to identify and investigate ML cases.

Burkina Faso

In February 2021, Burkina Faso made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and WAOA to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the completion of its MERA in 2014, Burkina Faso has made progress on a number of its MERA recommended actions to improve technical compliance and effectiveness, including by adopting a national AML/CFT strategy in December 2020. Burkina Faso will work to implement its action plan, including by:

1. Adopting and implementing follow-up mechanisms for monitoring actions at the national level;
2. Establishing a national anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing strategy and policy documents in line with its risk profile;
3. Strengthening the operational capacity and resources of all financial investigation units; and
4. Developing supervisory programmes and implementing risk-based supervision of financial institutions.

Cambodia

In February 2013, Cambodia made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APU to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime and address any related technical deficiencies. Cambodia should take urgent action to fully address remaining measures in its action plan as all timelines have already expired. Cambodia should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by:

1. Addressing the strategic deficiencies identified by the FATF.

The FATF notes Cambodia’s continued progress across its action plans, however, all deadlines have now expired and significant work remains. The FATF strongly urges Cambodia to swiftly complete its full action plan and address the above-mentioned strategic deficiencies.
The Cayman Islands

Since February 2021, when the Cayman Islands made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, the Cayman Islands has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by applying sanctions that are effective, proportionate and dissuasive, and taking administrative penalties and enforcement actions against obliged entities to ensure that AML/CFT breaches are remediated. The Cayman Islands should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) imposing adequate and effective sanctions in cases where relevant parties (including legal persons) do not file accurate, adequate and up-to-date beneficial ownership information in line with those requirements; and (2) demonstrating that they are prosecuting all types of money laundering in line with the jurisdiction's risk profile and that such prosecutions are resulting in the application of dissuasive, effective, and proportionate sanctions.

Haiti

In June 2021, Haiti made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Haiti will work to implement its action plan, including by: (1) developing its ML/TF risk assessment process and disseminating the findings; (2) facilitating information sharing with relevant foreign counterparts; (3) addressing the technical deficiencies in its legal and regulatory framework that impede the implementation of AML/CFT preventive measures and implementing risk-based AML/CFT supervision for all financial institutions and DNFBPs deemed to constitute a higher ML/TF risk; (4) ensuring that beneficial ownership information is maintained and accessible in a timely manner; (5) ensuring that the beneficial ownership information is maintained and accessible by competent authorities for combatting ML and TF; (6) addressing the technical deficiencies in its ML/TF enforcement and demonstrating authorities are identifying, investigating, and prosecuting ML cases in a manner consistent with Haiti's risk profile; (7) demonstrating an increase in identification, tracing, and recovery of proceeds of crimes; and (8) conducting appropriate risk-based monitoring of NPOs vulnerable to TF abuse without disrupting or discouraging legitimate NPO activities.

Jamaica

Since February 2020, when Jamaica made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Jamaica has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by implementing targeted financial sanctions for TF without delay. Jamaica should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) developing a more comprehensive understanding of its ML/TF risks; (2) including all FIIs and DNFBPs in the AML/CFT regime and ensuring adequate, risk-based supervision in all sectors; (3) taking measures to prevent legal persons and arrangements from being misused for criminal purposes, and ensuring that a comprehensive and up-to-date beneficial ownership information is available on a timely basis; (4) taking measures to increase the use of financial intelligence and to increase ML investigations and prosecutions, in line with the country's risk profile; and (5) implementing a risk-based approach for supervision of the NPO sector to prevent abuse for TF purposes.

Malta

In June 2021, Malta made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MDNMEWL to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its MER in July 2019, Malta has made progress on a number of the MER's recommended actions to improve its system, such as: strengthening the risk-based approach to FI and DNFBP supervision; improving the analytical process for financial intelligence; resourcing the police and empowering prosecutors to investigate and charge complex money laundering in line with Malta's risk profile; introducing a national confiscation policy as well as passing a non-conviction based confiscation law; raising sanctions available for the crimes of TF and capability to investigate cross-border cash movements for potential TF activity; and increasing outreach and immediate communication to reporting entities on targeted financial sanctions and improving the TF risk understanding of the NPO sector. Malta will work to implement its FATF action plan by (1) continuing to demonstrate that beneficial ownership information is accurate and that, where appropriate, effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions, commensurate with the ML/TF risks, are applied to legal persons if information provided is found to be inaccurate; and ensuring that effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions are applied to gatekeepers when they do not comply with their obligations to obtain accurate and up-to-date beneficial ownership information; (2) enhancing the use of the FIU's financial intelligence to support authorities pursuing criminal tax and related money laundering cases, including by clarifying the roles and responsibilities of the Commissioner for Revenue and the FIU; and (3) increasing the focus of the FIU's analysis on these types of offenders, to produce intelligence that helps Maltese law enforcement detect and investigate cases in line with Malta's identified ML risks related to tax evasion.

Mauritius

In February 2020, Mauritius made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. At its June 2021 Plenary, the FATF has made the initial determination that Mauritius has substantially completed its action plan and warrants an on-site assessment to verify that the implementation of Mauritius's AML/CFT reforms has begun and is being sustained, and that the necessary political commitment remains in place to sustain implementation in the future. Mauritius has made the following key reforms, including by: (1) conducting outreach to promote understanding of ML and TF risks and obligations; (2) developing risk-based supervision plans effectively for the Financial Services Commission; (3) ensuring access to accurate basic and beneficial ownership information by competent authorities in a timely manner; and (4) providing training for law enforcement authorities to ensure that they have the capability to conduct money laundering investigations. The FATF will continue to monitor the COVID-19 situation and conduct an on-site visit at the earliest possible date.
Morocco

In February 2021, Morocco made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Morocco should continue to work to implement its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) demonstrating effective implementation of the case management system to provide timely responses and prioritisation of MLA requests in line with the country’s risk profile; (2) improving risk-based supervision and taking remedial actions and applying effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for non-compliance; (3) ensuring that beneficial ownership information is adequate, accurate and verified, including information of legal persons and foreign legal arrangements; (4) increasing the diversity of STR reporting; (5) providing FIU with adequate financial and human resources to enhance analytical capabilities in order to fulfil its core mandate of operational and strategic analysis; (6) prioritising the identification, investigation and prosecution of all types of ML in accordance with the country’s risks; (7) building capacity of LEAs, prosecutors, and other relevant authorities to conduct parallel financial investigations, use financial intelligence, seize assets, and seek/provide MLA; and (8) monitoring and effectively supervising the compliance of PAs and DNFBPs with targeted financial sanctions obligations.

Myanmar

In February 2020, Myanmar made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APGs to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime and address any related technical deficiencies. Myanmar should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) demonstrating an improved understanding of ML risks in key areas; (2) demonstrating that onsite/offsite inspections are risk-based, and inspectors are prepared and supervised; (3) demonstrating enhanced use of financial intelligence in LEA investigations, and increasing operational analysis and disseminations by the FIU; (4) ensuring that ML is investigated/prosecuted in line with risks; (5) demonstrating investigation of transnational ML cases with international cooperation; (6) demonstrating an increase in the freezing/seizure and confiscation of criminal proceeds, instrumentalities, and/or property of equivalent value; (7) managing seized assets to preserve the value of seized goods until confiscation; and (8) demonstrating implementation of targeted financial sanctions related to PE, including training on sanctions evasion.

Nicaragua

Since February 2020, when Nicaragua made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GIAPPATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Nicaragua has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by updating its national risk assessment on ML/TF. Nicaragua should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) disseminating the outcomes of its ML/TF risk understanding to competent authorities and relevant private sector entities; (2) conducting effective, risk-based supervision; (3) taking appropriate measures to prevent legal persons and arrangements from being misused for criminal purposes.

Pakistan

Since June 2018, when Pakistan made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APGs to strengthen its AML/CFT regime and address its strategic counter terrorist financing-related deficiencies, Pakistan’s continued political commitment has led to significant progress across a comprehensive CFT action plan. The FATF recognizes Pakistan’s progress and efforts to address these CFT action plan items and notes that since February 2021, Pakistan has made progress to complete two of the three remaining action items on demonstrating that effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions are imposed for TF convictions and that Pakistan’s targeted financial sanctions regime was being used effectively to target terrorist assets. Pakistan has now completed 25 of the 27 action items in its 2018 action plan. The FATF encourages Pakistan to continue to make progress to address as soon as possible the one remaining CFT-related item by demonstrating that TF investigations and prosecutions target senior leaders and commanders of UN-designated terrorist groups.

In response to additional deficiencies later identified in Pakistan’s 2019 APG Mutual Evaluation Report (MERR), Pakistan has made progress to address a number of the recommended actions in the MERR and provided further high-level commitment in June 2021 to address these strategic deficiencies pursuant to a new action plan that primarily focuses on combating money laundering. Pakistan should continue to work to address its strategically important AML/CFT deficiencies, namely by: (1) enhancing international cooperation by amending the MLA law; (2) demonstrating that assistance is being sought from foreign countries in implementing UNSCR 1373 designations; (3) demonstrating that supervisors are conducting both on-site and off-site supervision commensurate with specific risks associated with DNFBPs, including applying appropriate sanctions where necessary; (4) demonstrating that proportionate and dissuasive sanctions are applied consistently to all legal persons and legal arrangements for non-compliance with beneficial ownership requirements; (5) demonstrating an increase in ML investigations and prosecutions and that proceeds of crime continue to be restrained and confiscated in line with Pakistan’s risk profile, including working with foreign counterparts to trace, freeze, and confiscate assets; and (6) demonstrating that DNFBPs are being monitored for compliance with proliferation financing requirements and that sanctions are being imposed for non-compliance.
Panama

Since June 2019, when Panama made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GAFILAT to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Panama has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by taking actions to identify unlicensed money remitters and increasing the use of FIU products to initiate or further ML investigations. However, Panama should take urgent action to fully address remaining measures in its action plan as all timelines have already expired. Panama should therefore continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) strengthening its understanding of the ML/TF risk of legal persons, as part of the corporate sector and informing findings to its national policies to mitigate the identified risks; (2) applying a risk-based approach to supervision of the DNBPs sector and ensuring effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions again AML/CFT violations; (3) ensuring adequate verification, of up-to-date beneficial ownership information by obliged entities and timely access by competent authorities, establishing an effective mechanism to monitor the activities of offshore entities, assessing the existing risks of misuse of legal persons and arrangements to define and implement specific measures to prevent the misuse of nominees shareholders and directors; and (4) demonstrating its ability to investigate and prosecute ML involving foreign tax crimes and continuing to provide constructive and timely international cooperation for such offences, and continuing to focus on ML investigations in relation to high-risk areas.

The FATF notes Panama’s continued progress across its action plan; however, all deadlines have now expired and significant work remains. The FATF therefore strongly urges Panama to swiftly complete its full action plan and address the above-mentioned strategic deficiencies.

Philippines

In June 2021, the Philippines made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APUs to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the completion of its MER in 2016, the Philippines has made progress on a number of its MER recommended actions to improve technical compliance and effectiveness, including by addressing technical deficiencies on targeted financial sanctions. The Philippines will work to implement its action plan, including by: (1) demonstrating that effective risk-based supervision of DNBPs is occurring; (2) demonstrating that supervisors are using AML/CFT controls to mitigate risks associated with small and medium-sized entities; (3) implementing the new regulations for MFIs and applying sanctions to unregistered and illegal remittance operators; (4) enhancing and streamlining LEA access to BOI information and taking steps to ensure that BOI information is accurate and up-to-date; (5) demonstrating an increase in the use of financial intelligence and an increase in ML investigations and prosecutions in line with risk; (6) demonstrating an increase in the identification, investigation and prosecution of TF cases; (7) demonstrating that appropriate measures are taken with respect to the NPO sector (including unregistered NPOs) without disrupting legitimate NPO activity; and (8) enhancing the effectiveness of the targeted financial sanctions framework for both TF and PF.

Senegal

(Statement from February 2021)

In February 2021, Senegal made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GAFILAT to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the completion of its MER in 2018, Senegal has made progress on a number of its MER recommended actions to improve technical compliance and effectiveness, including by adopting a National Strategy for AML/CFT and an Operational Plan to implement the Strategy. Senegal will work to implement its action plan, including by: (1) ensuring consistent understanding of ML/TF risks for particular related to the DNBPs sector across relevant authorities through training and outreach; (2) seeking MLA and other forms of international cooperation in line with its risk profile; (3) ensure that financial institutions and DNBPs are subject to adequate and effective supervision; (4) updating and maintaining comprehensive beneficial ownership information and strengthening the system of sanctions for violations of transparency obligations; (5) continuing to enhance the FIU’s human resources to ensure that it maintains effective operational analysis capabilities; (6) demonstrate that efforts aimed at strengthening detection mechanisms and reinforcing the capability to conduct ML/predicate offences investigations and prosecutions activities are sustained consistently in line with the Senegal’s risk profile; (7) establishing comprehensive and standardized practices and procedures for identifying, taking, seizing and confiscating proceeds and instrumentalities of crime in line with its risk profile; (8) strengthening the authorities understanding of TF risks and enhancing capacity and support for LEAs and prosecutorial authorities involved in TF investigations; (9) working closely with the IIF to develop an effective and targeted financial sanctions regime related to terrorist financing and proliferation financing as well as risk-based monitoring and supervision of NPOs.

South Sudan

In June 2021, South Sudan made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. South Sudan will work to implement its action plan, including by: (1) applying and engaging with ESAMLu for membership and committing to undergo a mutual evaluation by ESAMLu or other assessment body; (2) conducting a comprehensive review of the AML/CFT Act (2012), with the support of international partners, including technical assistance, to comply with the FATF Standards; (3) designating an authority/authorities in charge of coordinating the national ML/TF risks assessments; (4) becoming a party to and implementing the UN’s FATF Vienna Convention, the 2003 Palermo Convention, and the 1994 Terrorist Financing Convention; (5) implementing the legal and institutional framework to implement targeted financial sanctions in compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions on terrorism and proliferation financing; (6) operationalising a fully functioning and independent FIU; (7) establishing and implementing the legal and institutional framework to implement targeted financial sanctions in compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions on terrorism and proliferation financing; and (8) commencing implementation of targeted risk-based supervision/monitoring of NPOs at risk of TF abuse.
Syria

Since February 2020, when Syria made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAPATF to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Syria has made progress to improve its AML/CFT regime. In June 2014, the FATF determined that Syria had substantially addressed its action plan at a technical level, including by criminalising terrorism financing and establishing procedures for freezing terrorist assets. While the FATF determined that Syria has completed its agreed action plan, due to the security situation, the FATF has been unable to conduct an on-site visit to confirm whether the process of implementing the required reforms and actions has begun and is being sustained. The FATF will continue to monitor the situation, and will conduct an on-site visit at the earliest possible date.

Uganda

Since February 2020, when Uganda made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Uganda has taken some steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by adopting the National AML/CFT Strategy in September 2020 and completing the ML/TF risk assessment of legal persons and arrangements. Uganda should continue to work to implement its action plan. In addressing its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) seeking to cooperate with the country’s risk profile; (2) developing and implementing risk-based supervision of FIs and DFIs; (3) ensuring that competent authorities have the ability to identify, assess and control money laundering and terrorist financing; (4) strengthening the ML/TF risk profile; (5) developing and implementing policies and procedures for identifying, retaining, and disseminating data and information related to terrorism and other threats; and (6) demonstrating that LEAs conduct TF investigations and pursue prosecutions commensurate with Uganda’s TF risk profile. The FATF is monitoring Uganda’s oversight of NPOs. Uganda is urged to apply the risk-based approach to supervision of NPOs in line with the FATF standards.

Yemen

Since February 2020, when Yemen made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAPATF to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Yemen has made progress to improve its AML/CFT regime. In June 2014, the FATF determined that Yemen had substantially addressed its action plan at a technical level, including by: (1) adequately criminalising money laundering and terrorist financing; (2) developing and implementing risk-based supervision of FIs and DFIs; (3) ensuring that competent authorities have the ability to identify, assess and control money laundering and terrorist financing; (4) issuing guidance; (5) developing the monitoring and supervisory capacity of the financial sector supervisory authorities and the financial intelligence unit; and (6) establishing a fully operational and effectively functioning financial intelligence unit. While the FATF determined that Yemen has completed its agreed action plan, due to the security situation, the FATF has been unable to conduct an on-site visit to confirm whether the process of implementing the required reforms and actions has begun and is being sustained. The FATF will continue to monitor the situation, and conduct an on-site visit at the earliest possible date.

Zimbabwe

Since October 2019, when Zimbabwe made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime and address any related technical deficiencies, Zimbabwe has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by developing risk-based supervision manuals for financial institutions and higher-risk DFIs in line with the newly identified risks. Zimbabwe should continue to work on implementing its action plan, including by: (1) implementing risk-based supervision for FIs and DFIs; (2) ensuring development of adequate risk mitigation measures among FIs and DFIs; (3) ensuring that LEAs conduct TF investigations and pursue prosecutions; (4) creating mechanisms to ensure that competent authorities have access to timely and up-to-date beneficial ownership information; and (5) addressing remaining gaps in the PF-related targeted financial sanctions framework and demonstrating implementation.

Jurisdiction No Longer Subject to Increased Monitoring by the FATF

Ghana

The FATF welcomes Ghana’s significant progress in improving its AML/CFT regime. Ghana has strengthened the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime and addressed related technical deficiencies to meet the commitments in its action plan regarding the strategic deficiencies that the FATF identified in October 2018. Ghana is therefore no longer subject to the FATF’s increased monitoring process. Ghana will continue to work with GIABA to improve further its AML/CFT regime.

More on:
- [High-risk jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publicprivate/high-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions)
- [High-risk and other monitored jurisdictions](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publicprivate/high-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions)
ENCLOSURE 4: FATF Public Statements (June 2021)


A. FATF Public Statement on High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action

Category One
Into this category falls the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). The FATF reaffirms its call on its members and urges all jurisdictions to advise their financial institutions to give special attention to business relationships and transactions with DPRK, including DPRK1 companies and financial institutions, and those acting on their behalf. In addition to enhanced scrutiny, the FATF calls on its members and urges all jurisdictions to apply effective counter-measures, and targeted financial sanctions in accordance with applicable United Nations Security Council Resolutions to protect their financial sectors from money laundering, financing of terrorism and WMD proliferation financing (ML/FT/PF) risks emanating from DPRK. Jurisdictions should take necessary measures to close existing branches, subsidiaries and representatives offices of DPRK banks within their territories and terminate correspondent relations with DPRK banks, where required by relevant UNSC resolutions.

Category Two
Into this category falls Iran. The FATF calls on its members and urges all jurisdictions to continue to advise their financial institutions to apply enhanced due diligence to business relationships and transactions with natural and legal persons from Iran, consistent with FATF recommendation 19.

B. FATF Public Statement on Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring

Category Three
Into this category fall Albania, Barbados, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cayman Islands, Haiti, Jamaica, Malta, Mauritius, Morocco, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Senegal, South Sudan, Syria, Uganda, Yemen and Zimbabwe. This FATF Statement outlines the specific areas of weaknesses and requests member jurisdictions to consider the information in the document.

C. Required Action
The purpose of this letter is to ensure that senior management of all regulated entities and designated non-financial service providers is informed of these important issues and to request that it emphasizes the importance of this communication to its compliance officer and inform its management team of the risks associated with business involving these jurisdictions.

In addition to this important awareness raising, the CBA requires that all regulated entities take the following specific actions with regard to the following two categories of FATF listed countries:

1 Please note that with regard to DPRK, the FATF reaffirms its February 25, 2011 call on its members and urges to advise their financial institutions to give special attention to business relationships and transactions with DPRK companies and financial institutions.
Category One Action — the CBA requires all regulated entities and designated non-financial service providers to:

a) Conduct review of their client base on an ongoing basis to identify relationships or transactions with any connection to the Category One countries.

b) **Report such relationships or transactions to the CBA immediately.**

c) Any relationship or transaction found must be rated ultra-high risk and may only be continued if the regulated entity is satisfied it can monitor and mitigate the risks associated with such business. If the regulated entity is not satisfied the relationship must be exited.

d) Document its risk assessment and monitoring/mitigation strategy and have this document available should the CBA wish to evaluate it.

e) Record the progress of compliance with this action (or otherwise) in the board minutes.

All regulated entities and designated non-financial service providers are required to strictly comply with aforementioned instructions. The CBA will verify during the supervisory examinations whether this is done. Note in this respect that non-compliance will be treated very seriously.

Category Two Action — the CBA requires all regulated entities and designated non-financial service providers to:

a) **Review their client base to identify relationships or transactions with any connection to the Category Two country by July 30, 2021.**

b) Any relationship or transaction found must be rated at least high risk, taking this new or other information held into account.

c) Document its risk assessment and monitoring/mitigation strategy and have the document available should the CBA wish to evaluate it.

d) Record the progress of compliance with this action (or otherwise) in the board minutes.

**DEADLINE:** Please conclude the review of your client base by **July 30, 2021.** It is **not** necessary to send the results of your findings to the CBA. However, supervisory examinations by the CBA are likely to check that the work has been carried out within the stipulated time-frame. Non-compliance will be treated seriously.

Category Three Action — the CBA requires all regulated entities to:

a) Review their client base to identify relationships or transactions with any connection to the Category Three countries by **August 27, 2021.**

b) Re-evaluate its risk assessment of the relationship taking this new and any other information held into account.

c) Document its risk assessment and monitoring/mitigation strategy and have the document available should the CBA wish to evaluate it.

d) Record the progress of compliance with this action (or otherwise) in the board minutes.

**DEADLINE:** Please conclude the review of your client base by **August 27, 2021.** It is **not** necessary to send the results of your findings to the CBA. However, supervisory examinations by the CBA are likely to check that the work has been carried out within the stipulated time-frame. Non-compliance will be treated seriously.
ENCLOSURE 5: Regulatory framework

Pursuant to Article 11 of the AML/CFT State Ordinance, financial and trust service providers must perform enhanced customer due diligence, if and when a business relationship or a transaction by its nature entails a higher risk of money laundering or terrorist financing. The enhanced customer due diligence shall be carried out both prior to the business relation or the transaction, as during the business relationship in any case with natural persons, legal persons, trusts, and comparable entities that originate from countries or jurisdictions which do not or insufficiently apply the internationally accepted standards for the prevention and combating of money laundering and terrorist financing.

Pursuant to Article 13, paragraph 1, subsection a, of the AML/CFT State Ordinance, financial and trust service providers must pay special attention to business relationships and transactions with natural persons, legal persons and trusts originating from countries or jurisdictions that do not, or insufficiently comply with the internationally accepted AML/CFT standards.

According to Article 13, paragraph 2, of the AML/CFT State Ordinance if a financial or trust service provider can reasonably suspect that, amongst others, a transaction with a natural person, legal person or trust originating from a country or jurisdiction as meant in the first paragraph, does not have an apparent economic or legal purpose, it must investigate the background and the purpose of this transaction and record its findings in writing. These findings must be kept for at least ten years pursuant to Article 13, paragraph 3, of the AML/CFT State Ordinance.

Article 13 of the AML/CFT State Ordinance is related to Recommendation 19 of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)\(^2\) which states:

"Financial institutions should be required to apply enhanced due diligence measures to business relationships and transactions with natural and legal persons, and financial institutions, from countries for which this is called for by the FATF. The type of enhanced due diligence measures applied should be effective and proportionate to the risks. Countries should be able to apply appropriate countermeasures when called upon to do so by the FATF. Countries should also be able to apply countermeasures independently of any call by the FATF to do so. Such countermeasures should be effective and proportionate to the risks".

Furthermore, pursuant to chapter 5, section 5.3, subsection 5.3.2, of the AML/CFT Handbook, it is a regulatory requirement that a financial and trust service provider must treat countries and jurisdictions listed in the FATF statements (circulated by the CBA), which highlight jurisdictions which do not or insufficiently, apply the FATF Recommendations or which are the subject of international countermeasures, as countries and jurisdictions that do not or insufficiently apply the internationally accepted AML/CFT standards.

Pursuant to chapter 6, section 6.1, subsection 6.1.2, of the AML/CFT Handbook, it is a regulatory requirement that a financial and trust service provider must, as part of its ongoing customer due diligence (CDD) procedures, establish appropriate customer activity and transaction monitoring procedures that scrutinize the activity and transactions of its customers. The monitoring procedures must include those, amongst others, which provide for the identification and scrutiny of business relationships and transactions connected with jurisdictions which do not or insufficiently comply with the international AML/CFT standards, including but not limited to the FATF Recommendations.

Pursuant to chapter 8, section 8.1, subsection 8.1.2, of the AML/CFT Handbook, it is a regulatory requirement that a financial and trust service provider must keep adequate and orderly records containing the findings of reviews of activity and transactions connected with jurisdictions which do not, or insufficiently, apply the FATF Recommendations for a period of at least ten years from the date the business relationship ends, or, if in relation to an occasional transaction, for at least ten years from the date that the transaction was completed.