



ONLY VIA E-MAIL

February 25, 2026

To the Managements of all regulated financial institutions  
and designated non-financial businesses and professions  
supervised by the Centrale Bank van Aruba (CBA)

GMB/mmk/2.41/2.46/INT/13285

**Subject:** FATF Public Statement on High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action / FATF Public Statement on Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring / FATF Public Statements on the Russian Federation

Dear Management,

The purpose of this letter is to draw your urgent attention to:

- a. FATF Public Statement on High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action of February 13, 2026 (enclosure 1)

In relation to the **Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)**, the FATF calls on all members and urges all jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence and countermeasures to DPRK and its ability to facilitate transactions on its behalf. Given the heightened terrorist financing and proliferation financial threats emanating from **Iran**, countries are called upon to apply effective countermeasures on this high-risk jurisdiction to protect the international financial system.

Furthermore, in view of the continued lack of progress and the majority of its action items still not addressed, **Myanmar** remains on the FATF's list of countries subject to a call for action until its full action plan is completed. The FATF calls on all members and other jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence – and not countermeasures – proportionate to the risk emanating from the jurisdiction by increasing the degree and nature of monitoring of the business relationship for the purpose of determining whether those transactions or activities appear unusual or suspicious. When applying enhanced due diligence measures, countries are required to ensure that the flows of funds for humanitarian assistance, legitimate non-profit organization's (NPO's) activity and remittances are neither disrupted nor discouraged.

- b. FATF Public Statement on Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring of February 13, 2026 (enclosure 2)

The FATF has identified **Algeria, Angola, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Monaco, Namibia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, South Sudan, Syria, Venezuela, Vietnam, Virgin Islands (UK), and Yemen** as jurisdictions that have strategic AML/CFT deficiencies. The information included in enclosure 4 must be included in your business risk assessment when conducting transactions with natural persons or entities established in these jurisdictions.





Note that following the FATF Plenary in February 2026, no jurisdictions were removed from the FATF list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring.

- c. FATF Public Statements on the Russian Federation of February 23, 2024, and February 24, 2023 (enclosure 3)

As a suspended member of the FATF due to the Russian Federation's unprovoked war against Ukraine, the Russian Federation remains accountable for its obligation to implement the FATF Standards. The suspension of the membership of the Russian Federation continues to stand. Furthermore, the FATF reiterates that all jurisdictions should remain alert of current and emerging risks from the circumvention of measures taken against the Russian Federation to protect the financial system. The FATF continues to call upon all jurisdictions to remain vigilant of threats to the integrity, safety and security of the international financial system (e.g., inter alia, growing financial connectivity of Russian Federation with countries subject to FATF countermeasures, risks of proliferation financing, as well as malicious cyber activities and ransomware attacks), arising from the Russian Federation's war against Ukraine.

#### REQUIRED ACTIONS

The CBA requires all regulated entities and designated non-financial businesses and professions to take duly notice of the information contained in the enclosures, as well as of the required follow-up actions that need to be taken.

Further details, including the actions that your institution is required to take, are outlined in enclosure 4. The relevant regulatory framework is also enclosed for your convenience (enclosure 5).

If you have any questions regarding this letter, please contact Ms. G. Brito of the Integrity Supervision Department at telephone number (+297) 525-2175 or by email [g.brito@cbaruba.org](mailto:g.brito@cbaruba.org).

Sincerely yours,

Centrale Bank van Aruba

Enclosures: 5

cc Head of the Financial Intelligence Unit



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High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action - 13 February 2026

# High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action - 13 February 2026

## Publication details

**Language**

English

**Country**

[Democratic Republic of](#)

[Korea](#)


[Iran](#)

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**Topic**

[High-risk and other](#)

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## **"black list"**

*Mexico, 13 February, 2026*

High-risk jurisdictions have significant strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and financing of proliferation. For all countries identified as high-risk, the FATF calls on all members and urges all jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence, and, in the most serious cases, countries are called upon to apply counter-measures to protect the international financial system from the money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing (ML/TF/PF) risks emanating from the country. This list is often externally referred to as the "black list".

Since February 2020, Iran reported in January, August and December 2024 and August and November 2025 with no material changes in the status of its action plan.

Given heightened proliferation financing risks, the FATF reiterates its call to apply countermeasures on these high-risk jurisdictions.

## **Jurisdictions subject to a FATF call on its members and other jurisdictions to apply countermeasures**

### ***Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)***

Building upon the FATF statements over the past decade, the FATF remains concerned by the DPRK's continued failure to address the significant deficiencies in its anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime and the serious threats posed by the DPRK's illicit activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and its financing.

The FATF has continually reiterated since 2011 the need for all countries to robustly implement the targeted financial sanctions in accordance with UNSC Resolutions and apply the following countermeasures to protect their financial systems from the money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing threat emanating from DPRK:

- Terminate correspondent relationships with DPRK banks;
- Close any subsidiaries or branches of DPRK banks in their countries; and
- Limit business relationships & financial transactions with DPRK persons.

Despite these calls, DPRK has increased connectivity with the international financial system, which raises proliferation financing (PF) risks, as the FATF noted in February 2024. This requires greater vigilance and renewed implementation and enforcement of these countermeasures against the DPRK. As set out in UNSCR 2270, DPRK frequently uses front companies, shell companies, joint ventures and complex, opaque ownership structures for the purpose of violating sanctions. As such, FATF encourages its members and all countries to apply enhanced due diligence to the DPRK and its ability to facilitate transactions on its behalf.

The FATF also urges countries to adequately assess and account for the increased proliferation financing risk with the greater financial connectivity reported, particularly since the next round of assessments requires countries to adequately assess PF risks under Recommendation 1 and Immediate Outcome 11. The ability to obtain reliable and credible information to support the assessment of PF risks relating to the DPRK is hampered by the recent termination of the 1718 Committee Panel of Experts mandate. Thus, the FATF will monitor the measures to comply with DPRK targeted financial sanctions and the implementation of countermeasures against DPRK.

## ***Iran***

The FATF acknowledges Iran's re-engagement with the FATF as Iran aims to address deficiencies in its AML/CFT regime. In June 2016, Iran provided a high-level political commitment to address those deficiencies through an action plan that expired in January 2018. In October 2019, given Iran's lack of progress on its action plan, the FATF called upon its members and urged all jurisdictions to: require increased supervisory examination for branches and subsidiaries of financial institutions based in Iran; introduce enhanced relevant reporting mechanisms or systematic reporting of financial transactions; and require increased external audit requirements for financial groups with respect to any of their branches and subsidiaries located in Iran. Since February 2020, given Iran's failure to fully address its action plan, the FATF has called upon its members and required all jurisdictions to apply effective countermeasures in line with Recommendation 19.

In January 2026, Iran provided an update to the FATF on its ratification of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Convention) and United Nations Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (TF Convention). While the FATF takes note of Iran's submission and engagement, at this time, the FATF assesses that the reservations Iran has made to the Palermo and TF Conventions are overly broad and that Iran's domestic compliance with these Conventions is not in line with the FATF standards. The FATF also notes Iran has failed to address the majority of its action plan since 2016.

Considering the United Nations Security Council Resolutions related to Iran's lack of compliance with its nuclear non-proliferation obligations, the FATF reminds all jurisdictions of their obligations under the FATF standards to address proliferation financing risks emanating from Iran. Additionally, given the ongoing terrorist financing and proliferation financing threats emanating from Iran and as Iran's action plan remains incomplete, the FATF reiterates its call on its members and urges all jurisdictions to apply effective countermeasures on Iran, including the following:

- Refusing the establishment of subsidiaries or branches or representative offices of financial institutions and virtual asset service providers from the country concerned or otherwise taking into account the fact that the relevant financial institution or virtual asset service provider is from a country that does not have adequate AML/CFT systems; and
- Prohibiting financial institutions and virtual asset service providers from establishing branches or representative offices in the country concerned or otherwise taking into account the fact that the relevant branch or representative office would be in a country that does not have adequate AML/CFT systems.
- On a risk basis, limiting business relationships or financial transactions, including virtual asset transactions, with the identified country or persons in the country concerned.
- Prohibiting financial institutions and virtual asset service providers from establishing new correspondent relationships and requiring them to undertake a risk-based review of existing correspondent relationships with

financial institutions and virtual asset service providers in the country concerned.

When applying countermeasures, countries should ensure that flows of funds involving humanitarian assistance, food and health supplies, diplomatic operating costs, and personal remittances are appropriately handled on a risk basis considering the terrorist financing or proliferation financing risks emanating from Iran, in line with international obligations. Iran will remain on the list of *FATF High Risk Jurisdictions Subject to a Call for Action* until the full Action Plan has been completed. As the FATF previously stated, should Iran ratify and implement the Palermo and Terrorist Financing Conventions, in line with the FATF standards, the FATF will decide on next steps, including whether to suspend countermeasures. The FATF may consider additional next steps if Iran fails to demonstrate additional progress on its action plan.

The FATF strongly encourages Iran to work with the FATF to urgently make further progress on its action plan to fully address: (1) adequately criminalizing terrorist financing, including by removing the exemption for designated groups “attempting to end foreign occupation, colonialism and racism”; (2) identifying and freezing terrorist assets in line with the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions; (3) ensuring an adequate and enforceable customer due diligence regime; (4) demonstrating how authorities are identifying and sanctioning unlicensed money/value transfer service providers; (5) ensure that the ratification and implementation of the Palermo and TF Conventions are in line with the FATF standards and clarify the capability to provide mutual legal assistance; and (6) ensuring that financial institutions verify that wire transfers contain complete originator and beneficiary information.

**Jurisdiction subject to a FATF call on its members and other jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence**

# measures proportionate to the risks arising from the jurisdiction

The FATF calls for the application of enhanced due diligence – and not countermeasures – on the below jurisdiction.

## *Myanmar*

In February 2020, Myanmar committed to address its strategic deficiencies. Myanmar's action plan expired in September 2021.

In October 2022, given the continued lack of progress and the majority of its action items still not addressed after a year beyond the action plan deadline, the FATF decided that further action was necessary in line with its procedures and FATF calls on its members and other jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence measures proportionate to the risk arising from Myanmar. The FATF requires that as part of enhanced due diligence, financial institutions should increase the degree and nature of monitoring of the business relationship, in order to determine whether those transactions or activities appear unusual or suspicious. If no further progress is made by June 2026, the FATF will consider countermeasures.

Myanmar should urgently work to implement its FATF action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including: (1) demonstrating enhanced use of financial intelligence in law enforcement authorities (LEAs) investigations, and increasing operational analysis and disseminations by the financial intelligence unit (FIU); (2) ensuring that ML is investigated/prosecuted in line with risks; (3) demonstrating investigation of transnational ML cases with international cooperation; and (4) demonstrating an increase in the freezing/seizing and confiscation of criminal proceeds, instrumentalities, and/or property of equivalent value.

When applying enhanced due diligence, countries should ensure that flows of funds for humanitarian assistance, legitimate NPO activity and remittances are neither disrupted nor discouraged. Especially in relation to earthquake relief efforts in Myanmar, the FATF recognizes the importance of ensuring that implementation of its Recommendations does not adversely and disproportionately affect NPOs and further, does not unduly hinder civil society and the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The FATF will also continue to monitor whether Myanmar's AML/CFT activities apply undue scrutiny to legitimate financial flows.

Myanmar will remain on the list of countries subject to a call for action until its full action plan is completed.

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## Related materials

13 Feb 2026

### [Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring - 13 February 2026](#)

Jurisdictions under increased monitoring are actively working with the FATF to address strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing. The FATF now also identifies Kuwait and Papua New Guinea.



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Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring - 13 February 2026

# Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring - 13 February 2026

## Publication details

### Language

English

### Country

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[Bolivia](#), [Bulgaria](#),  
[Cameroon](#), [Côte d'Ivoire](#),  
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 Congo](#), [Haiti](#), [Kenya](#),  
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### Topic

[High-risk and other  
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## "grey list"

*Mexico, 13 February 2026*

Jurisdictions under increased monitoring are actively working with the FATF to address strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing. When the FATF places a jurisdiction under increased monitoring, it means the country has committed to resolve swiftly the identified strategic deficiencies

within agreed timeframes and is subject to increased monitoring. This list is often externally referred to as the “grey list”.

The FATF and FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs) continue to work with the jurisdictions below as they report on the progress achieved in addressing their strategic deficiencies. The FATF calls on these jurisdictions to complete their action plans expeditiously and within the agreed timeframes. The FATF welcomes their commitment and will closely monitor their progress. The FATF does not call for the application of enhanced due diligence measures to be applied to these jurisdictions. The FATF Standards do not envisage de-risking, or cutting-off entire classes of customers, but call for the application of a risk-based approach. Therefore, the FATF encourages its members and all jurisdictions to take into account the information presented below in their risk analysis. As countries consider actions based on their risk analysis taking into account the information below, they should ensure that flows of funds for humanitarian assistance, legitimate NPO activity and remittances are neither disrupted nor discouraged. Countries should also consider their international obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolution 2761 (2024) on humanitarian exemptions to asset freeze measures imposed by UN sanctions regimes.

The FATF identifies additional jurisdictions, on an on-going basis, that have strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing. A number of jurisdictions have not yet been reviewed by the FATF or their FSRBs, but will be in due course.

The FATF provides some flexibility to jurisdictions not facing immediate deadlines to report progress on a voluntary basis. The following countries had their progress reviewed by the FATF since October 2025: Algeria, Angola, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Monaco, Namibia, Nepal, South

Sudan, Venezuela, Vietnam, the Virgin Islands (UK) and Yemen. For these countries, updated statements are provided below. Haiti and Syria chose to defer reporting; thus, the statements issued previously for those jurisdictions are included below, but it may not necessarily reflect the most recent status of the jurisdictions' AML/CFT regimes. Following review, the FATF now also identified Kuwait and Papua New Guinea.

## ALGERIA

In October 2024, Algeria made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. At its February 2026 Plenary, the FATF made the initial determination that Algeria has substantially completed its action plan and warrants an on-site assessment to verify that the implementation of AML/CFT reforms has begun and is being sustained, and that the necessary political commitment remains in place to sustain implementation in the future. Algeria has made the following reforms: (1) improving risk-based supervision, especially for higher risk sectors, including through the adoption of new procedures, risk assessments, supervision manuals and guidelines, as well as undertaking inspections and applying effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions; (2) developing an effective framework for basic and beneficial ownership information; (3) enhancing its regime for suspicious transaction reports; (4) establishing an effective legal and institutional framework for targeted financial sanctions for terrorism financing; and (5) implementing a risk-based approach to oversight of non-profit organisations, without disrupting or discouraging legitimate activity.

## ANGOLA

In October 2024, Angola made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Angola should continue to work with the FATF to implement its FATF action plan by: (1)

enhancing its understanding of ML/TF risks; (2) improving risk-based supervision of non-financial banking entities and DNFBPs; (3) ensuring competent authorities have adequate, accurate and timely access to beneficial ownership information and that breaches to obligations are adequately addressed; (4) demonstrating an increase in ML investigations and prosecutions; (5) demonstrating the ability to identify, investigate and prosecute TF; and (6) demonstrating an effective process to implement targeted financial sanctions without delay.

## **BOLIVIA**

Since June 2025, when Bolivia made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GAFILAT to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Bolivia has taken steps to improve its AML/CFT regime by ensuring that beneficial ownership information is accurate and up-to-date. Bolivia should continue working to implement its FATF action plan by: (1) ensuring relevant special investigative techniques can be used in ML investigations; (2) implementing risk-based supervision of real estate agents, lawyers, accountants and DPMS; (3) ensuring that breaches to beneficial ownership obligations are sanctioned; and (4) increasing ML investigations and prosecutions in line with the country's risks (including other high-risk predicates in addition to corruption and drug trafficking).

## **BULGARIA**

Since October 2023, when Bulgaria made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MONEYVAL to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Bulgaria has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including in the last reporting cycle by addressing remaining technical compliance deficiencies including in relation to confiscation and demonstrating initial implementation of risk-based monitoring of NPOs to prevent abuse for TF purposes.

The FATF notes Bulgaria continued progress across its action plan, however all deadlines have now expired and work remains to address its remaining strategic

deficiency in relation to improving investigations and prosecutions of different types of money laundering in line with risks, including high-scale corruption and organised crime. The FATF encourages Bulgaria to build on its recent progress and continue to implement its action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic deficiency as soon as possible.

## CAMEROON

Since June 2023, when Cameroon made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GABAC to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Cameroon has taken steps to improve its AML/CFT regime by designating an authority for AML/CFT supervision of all DNFBPs and by effectively conducting a range of investigations, including conducting parallel financial investigations and seeking international cooperation, and prosecute ML in line with risks. Cameroon should continue working on implementing its FATF action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) enhancing risk-based supervision of banks and implementing effective risk-based supervision for non-bank FIs and DNFBPs, and conducting appropriate outreach to high-risk FIs and DNFBPs; (2) enhancing secure information exchange between the FIU, reporting entities and competent authorities and demonstrating an increase in dissemination of intelligence reports to support operational needs of competent authorities; (3) implementing policies and procedures for seizing and confiscating proceeds and instrumentalities of crime and managing frozen, seized and confiscated property, and prioritising seizure and confiscation of assets at the border; (4) demonstrating effective implementation of TF and PF TFS regimes and implementing a risk-based approach to NPOs without disrupting legitimate NPO activities.

The FATF notes Cameroon continued progress across its action plan, however all deadlines have now expired and work remains. The FATF encourages Cameroon to continue to implement its action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic deficiencies as soon as possible.

## CÔTE D'IVOIRE

Since October 2024, when Côte d'Ivoire made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GIABA to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Côte d'Ivoire has taken steps to improve its AML/CFT regime by improving the implementation of risk-based supervision of financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and professions, enhancing the use of financial intelligence by law enforcement authorities and improving disseminations by the FIU and demonstrating a sustained increase in the number of TF investigations and prosecutions in line with the country's risk profile. Côte d'Ivoire should continue working on implementing its FATF action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by demonstrating a sustained increase in the number of investigations and prosecutions of different types of ML offences in line with the country's risk profile.

## DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Since October 2022, when the DRC made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GABAC to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, the DRC has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by developing risk-based supervision plans for financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and professions, addressing most technical compliance deficiencies with R.5, 10, 11 and 20, demonstrating its ability to conduct effective ML investigations and prosecutions and demonstrating effective implementation of TF and PF-related TFS. The DRC should continue to work to implement its FATF action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) implementing its risk-based supervision plan; and (2) identifying and investigating TF activities in line with its risks.

The FATF notes that the DRC continued progress across its action plan, however all deadlines have now expired and work remains. The FATF encourages the DRC to continue to implement its action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic deficiencies as soon as possible.

## HAITI

***(Statement from October 2025)***

Since June 2021, when Haiti made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Haiti has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including implementing risk-based AML/CFT supervision for all financial institutions; and ensuring the FIU has adequate resources and processes to produce and disseminate operational and strategic analysis to competent authorities for combatting ML and TF. The FATF recognises the political commitment expressed at a high level and the efforts demonstrated by Haiti to advance its commitment in the midst of the challenging social, economic and security situation within the country. Haiti should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) completing its ML/TF risk assessment process and disseminating the findings; (2) implementing risk-based AML/CFT supervision for DNFBPs deemed to constitute a higher ML/TF risk; (3) ensuring basic and beneficial ownership information are maintained and accessible in a timely manner; (4) demonstrating authorities are identifying, investigating and prosecuting ML cases in a manner consistent with Haiti's risk profile; (5) demonstrating an increase of identification, tracing and recovery of proceeds of crimes; (6) addressing the technical deficiencies in its targeted financial sanctions regime; and (7) conducting appropriate risk-based monitoring of NPOs vulnerable to TF abuse without disrupting or discouraging legitimate NPO activities.

The FATF notes Haiti's continued progress across its action plan, however all deadlines have expired and work remains. The FATF encourages Haiti to continue to implement its action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic deficiencies.

**KENYA**

Since February 2024, when Kenya made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Kenya has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by

strengthening the capacities of AML/CFT supervisors, adopting a legal framework for the licensing and supervision of virtual assets service providers and demonstrating a sustained increase in TF investigations and prosecutions in line with the country's risk profile. Kenya should continue to work to implement its FATF action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) improving risk-based AML/CFT supervision of FIs and DNFBPs; (2) enhancing the understanding of preventive measures by FIs and DNFBPs, including to increase STR filing and implement TFS without delay; (3) designating an authority for the regulation of trusts and collection of accurate and up-to-date beneficial ownership information and implementing remedial actions for breaches of compliance with transparency requirements for legal persons and arrangements; (4) improving the use and quality of financial intelligence products; (5) increasing ML investigations and prosecutions in line with risks; (6) bringing the TFS framework in compliance with R.6 and ensure its effective implementation; and (7) revising the framework for NPO regulation and oversight to ensure that mitigating measures are risk-based and do not disrupt or discourage legitimate NPO activity.

## KUWAIT

In February 2026, Kuwait made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its MER in June 2024, Kuwait has made significant progress on the vast majority of its MER's recommended actions, including adopting a new national AML/CFT/CPF strategy, further improving its technical compliance framework for TF and PF targeted financial sanctions, further enhancing its understanding of ML and TF risks and conducting risk-based outreach and supervision of financial institutions and DNFBPs. Kuwait will continue to work with the FATF to implement its FATF action plan by: (1) enhancing outreach to real estate agents and DPMSs on STR reporting, including through distribution of sector-based indicators of ML/TF; (2) ensuring that beneficial ownership information in the registry is accurate, and applying effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions in cases of inaccurate information where appropriate; (3) increasing ML investigations and prosecutions in relation to cross-border movements of currency and BNIs.

## LAO PDR

In February 2025, Lao PDR made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Lao PDR should continue to work on implementing its FATF action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including: (1) enhancing its understanding of ML/TF risks; (2) improving risk-based supervision of casinos, banks, and reporting entities in SEZs, including fit and proper checks; (3) enhancing the quality and quantity of financial intelligence analysis and spontaneous dissemination to law enforcement agencies; (4) ensuring that law enforcement agencies receive training and guidance on money laundering; (5) demonstrating an increase in ML investigations and prosecutions in line with Lao PDR's risk profile, with an emphasis on crimes with a transnational element that require international co-operation; (6) developing a national confiscation policy consistent with its ML/TF risks; (7) demonstrating that relevant competent authorities are taking measures to identify, seize, and, where applicable, confiscate proceeds and instrumentalities of crime in line with the risk profile; (8) monitoring FIs' and DNFBPs' compliance with PF TFS obligations; and (9) addressing technical compliance deficiencies in Recommendations 6, 7, and 10.

## LEBANON

In October 2024, Lebanon made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime in spite of the challenging social, economic and security situation within the country. Lebanon should continue working on implementing its FATF action plan to address its strategic deficiencies by: (1) conducting assessments of specific terrorist financing and money laundering risks identified in the MER and ensuring that policies and measures are in place to mitigate these risks; (2) enhancing mechanisms to ensure the timely and effective execution of requests for mutual legal assistance, extradition and asset recovery; (3) enhancing DNFBPs' risk understanding and applying effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for breaches of AML/CFT

obligations; (4) ensuring beneficial ownership information is up-to-date and that there are adequate sanctions and risk-mitigating in place for legal persons; (5) enhancing competent authorities' use of products of the FIU and financial intelligence; (6) demonstrating a sustained increase in investigations, prosecutions and court rulings for types of ML in line with the risk; (7) improving its approach to asset recovery and identifying and seizing illicit cross-border movements of currency and precious metals and stones; (8) pursuing TF investigations and sharing information with foreign partners related to investigations of TF as called for in the MER; (9) enhancing the implementation of targeted financial sanctions without delay, particularly at DNFBPs and certain non-banking financial institutions; and (10) undertaking targeted and risk-based monitoring of high-risk NPOs, without disrupting or discouraging legitimate NPO activities.

## MONACO

Since June 2024, when Monaco made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MONEYVAL to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Monaco has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime on many of its action items, including by strengthening the timeliness of STR reporting. Monaco should continue to work on implementing its FATF action plan by: (1) enhancing the application of sanctions for AML/CFT breaches and (2) applying effective, dissuasive and proportionate sanctions for ML.

The FATF notes Monaco continued progress across its action plan, however all deadlines have now expired and work remains. The FATF encourages Monaco to build on its recent progress and continue to implement its action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic deficiencies as soon as possible.

## NAMIBIA

In February 2024, Namibia made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. At its

February 2026 Plenary the FATF made the initial determination that Namibia has substantially completed its action plan and warrants an on-site assessment to verify that the implementation of AML/CFT reforms has begun and is being sustained, and that the necessary political commitment remains in place to sustain implementation in the future. Namibia has made the following reforms: (1) strengthening its AML/CFT risk based supervision through enhancing the human and resource capacities, conducting offsite and onsite inspections informed by supervisory risk assessment tools and applying effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for breaches of AML/CFT obligations; (2) enhancing preventive measures through inspections and outreach to ensure that FIs and DNFBPs apply enhanced due diligence measures as well as TFS obligations related to TF and PF without delay; (3) increasing the filing of beneficial ownership information of legal persons and arrangements, and applying remedial actions and/or effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions against breaches of compliance with BO obligations; (4) providing the FIU with adequate human and financial resources, as well as trainings, to improve operational and strategic analysis; (5) improving the cooperation between the FIU and LEAs to enhance the use and integration of financial intelligence in investigations; (6) enhancing the operational capabilities of authorities involved in ML and TF investigations and prosecutions by providing them with adequate resources and targeted trainings; (7) demonstrating the LEAs' capabilities to effectively investigate and prosecute ML/TF cases; and (8) approving the amended National Counter Terrorism Strategy.

## NEPAL

In February 2025, Nepal made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Nepal should continue to work on implementing its FATF action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including: (1) improving its understanding of key ML/TF risks; (2) improving risk-based supervision of commercial banks, higher-risk cooperatives, casinos, DPMS, and the real estate sector; (3) demonstrating the identification and sanctioning of materially significant illegal MVTs/hundi providers, without hindering financial inclusion; (4) increasing capacity and co-ordination of competent authorities to conduct ML investigations; (5) demonstrating an increase in ML

investigations and prosecutions; (6) demonstrating measures to identify, trace, restrain, seize, and, where applicable, confiscate proceeds and instrumentalities of crime in line with the risk profile; (7) addressing remaining technical compliance deficiencies in its targeted financial sanctions regime for TF and PF.

## PAPUA NEW GUINEA

In February 2026, Papua New Guinea made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its MER in September 2024, Papua New Guinea has made progress on some of the MER's recommended actions including operationalizing and strengthening the anti-corruption authority, developing a national risk assessment and automating communication of UNSCR updates to relevant government agencies and reporting entities. Papua New Guinea will continue to work with the FATF to implement its FATF action plan by: (1) improving its understanding of ML risks and endorsing the National AML/CFT/CPF Strategic Plan; (2) proactively seeking outbound international cooperation to identify and trace criminal property abroad; (3) improving risk-based supervision of banks, MVTS/FX dealers and higher risk DNFBPs; (4) demonstrating an increase in ML investigations and prosecutions; (5) demonstrating an increase in freezing/seizing and confiscation of criminal proceeds, instrumentalities and property of equivalent value; (6) conducting training for competent authorities to enhance their understanding of TFS-PF implementation; (7) addressing technical compliance deficiencies, including with respect to the ML offence, TF offence, TFS-PF, politically exposed persons and suspicious transaction reporting.

## SOUTH SUDAN

Since June 2021, when South Sudan made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, South Sudan has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by

conducting awareness raising to develop a common understanding among relevant stakeholders of the main ML/TF risks, including those associated with legal persons and the NPO sector. South Sudan has also developed AML/CFT/CPF policies and strategies informed by the results of the National Risk Assessment and accelerated implementation of plans to communicate the AML/CFT guidance to FIs. Law enforcement agencies, investigative authorities, and judiciary have been provided with the necessary resources (human, technical, financial) and training. South Sudan should continue to work to implement its action plan, including by: (1) ensuring that competent authorities are suitably structured and capacitated to implement a risk-based approach to AML/CFT supervision for financial institutions; (2) developing a comprehensive legal framework to collect and verify the accuracy of beneficial ownership information for legal persons; (3) finalising the operationalisation of a fully functioning and independent FIU; (4) establishing and implementing the legal and institutional framework to implement targeted financial sanctions in compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions on terrorism and WMD proliferation financing; and (5) commencing implementation of targeted risk-based supervision/monitoring of NPOs at risk of TF abuse.

The FATF notes South Sudan's limited progress across its action plan with all deadlines now expired and work remaining. The FATF again encourages South Sudan to continue to implement its action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic deficiencies as soon as possible and demonstrate strong political and institutional commitment to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, particularly in supporting the lead AML/CFT agency in coordinating national AML/CFT efforts.

## SYRIA

### ***(Statement from February 2023)***

Since February 2010, when Syria made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Syria has made progress to improve its AML/CFT regime. In June 2014, the FATF determined that Syria had substantially addressed its action plan at a technical level, including by criminalising terrorist financing and establishing procedures for freezing terrorist assets. While the FATF determined that Syria has completed its agreed action plan,

due to the security situation, the FATF has been unable to conduct an on-site visit to confirm whether the process of implementing the required reforms and actions has begun and is being sustained. The FATF will continue to monitor the situation, and will conduct an on-site visit at the earliest possible date.

## VENEZUELA

In June 2024, Venezuela made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Venezuela should continue working on implementing its FATF action plan to address its strategic deficiencies by: (1) strengthening its understanding of ML/TF risks, including in relation to TF and legal persons and arrangements; (2) ensuring the full range of financial institutions and DNFBPs are subject to AML/CFT measures and risk-based supervision; (3) ensuring adequate, accurate and up-to-date beneficial ownership information is accessible in a timely manner; (4) enhancing the resources of the FIU and improving competent authorities' use of financial intelligence; (5) enhancing the investigation and prosecution of ML and TF; (6) ensuring measures to prevent the abuse of NPOs for TF are targeted, proportionate, and risk-based and do not disrupt or discourage legitimate activities within the NPO sector; and (7) implementing TF- and PF-related targeted financial sanctions without delay.

In particular, the FATF is especially concerned about Venezuela's approach to conducting oversight of the NPO sector; the FATF calls on Venezuela to urgently consider whether certain sections of the November 2024 NPO law should be re-examined and potentially altered so that it is in line with the FATF's risk-based approach for supervision of the NPO sector and the FATF's best practices on Recommendation 8.

## VIETNAM

Since June 2023, when Vietnam made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime,

Vietnam has taken some steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including improving domestic AML/CFT co-ordination and co-operation at the operational level. Vietnam should continue to work on implementing its FATF action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including: (1) increasing risk understanding; (2) enhancing international co-operation; (3) implementing effective risk-based supervision for FIs and DNFBPs; (4) taking action to regulate virtual assets and virtual asset service providers; (5) addressing technical compliance deficiencies, including with respect to the ML offence, targeted financial sanctions, customer due diligence and suspicious transaction reporting; (6) conducting outreach activities with the private sector; (7) establishing a regime that provides competent authorities with adequate, accurate and up-to-date information on beneficial ownership; (8) enhancing the quality and quantity of financial intelligence analysis and dissemination; (9) prioritising parallel financial investigations and demonstrating an increase in the number of ML investigations and prosecutions undertaken; and (10) demonstrating that there is monitoring of FIs and DNFBPs for compliance with PF TFS obligations and that there is co-operation and co-ordination between authorities to prevent PF TFS from being evaded.

The FATF strongly urges Vietnam to swiftly implement its action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic deficiencies as soon as possible as all deadlines expired in May 2025.

## **VIRGIN ISLANDS (UK)**

Since June 2025, when the Virgin Islands (UK) made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, the Virgin Islands (UK) has taken steps to improve its AML/CFT regime by strengthening fit and proper checks, ensuring basic information on legal persons is available to the general public, and raising awareness of how legal persons can be misused for money laundering and terrorist financing. The Virgin Islands (UK) should continue working to implement its FATF action plan by: (1) enhancing risk-based supervision of TCSPs, Investment Businesses and VASPs; (2) ensuring that accurate and up-to-date beneficial ownership information is available to competent authorities and breaches to obligations are sanctioned; (3) improving

the quality of SARs and ensuring that reporting is in line with risk; (4) systematically pursuing ML investigations and prosecutions in line with risk; (5) increasing the seizure and confiscation of criminal proceeds; and (6) operationalising the new asset management framework.

## YEMEN

### ***(Statement from February 2023)***

Since February 2010, when Yemen made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Yemen has made progress to improve its AML/CFT regime. In June 2014, the FATF determined that Yemen had substantially addressed its action plan at a technical level, including by: (1) adequately criminalising money laundering and terrorist financing; (2) establishing procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets; (3) improving its customer due diligence and suspicious transaction reporting requirements; (4) issuing guidance; (5) developing the monitoring and supervisory capacity of the financial sector supervisory authorities and the financial intelligence unit; and (6) establishing a fully operational and effectively functioning financial intelligence unit. While the FATF determined that Yemen has completed its agreed action plan, due to the security situation, the FATF has been unable to conduct an on-site visit to confirm whether the process of implementing the required reforms and actions has begun and is being sustained. The FATF will continue to monitor the situation, and conduct an on-site visit at the earliest possible date.

## Related materials

13 Feb 2026

### [Outcomes FATF Plenary, 11-13 February 2026](#)

The fifth Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Plenary meeting under the Mexican Presidency of Elisa de Anda Madrazo concluded today, with action agreed to help stop fraudsters and other criminals from profiting from illicit activity.

13 Feb 2026

### [Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring - 13 February 2026](#)

Jurisdictions under increased monitoring are actively working with the FATF to address strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing. The FATF now also identifies Kuwait and Papua New Guinea.

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**[FATF Statement on the Russian Federation](#)**

# FATF Statement on the Russian Federation

## Publication details

Language

Country

Topic

*Paris, 23 February 2024* – Two years after the Russian Federation’s unprovoked war against Ukraine, the FATF recalls its statement of 24 February 2023 (see below).

FATF members note with concern the potential risks to the international financial system, including growing financial connectivity of Russia with countries subject to FATF countermeasures, risks of proliferation financing, and malicious cyber activities and ransomware attacks. Due to the gravity of these

risks, many FATF members are taking proactive measures to protect themselves and the global financial system.

The FATF calls upon all jurisdictions to continue to remain vigilant due to the above-mentioned risks. As they have done since the Russian Federation commenced its war of aggression, FATF members will continue to monitor the situation and the risks posed to the global financial system. As a suspended member of the FATF, the Russian Federation still remains accountable for its obligation to implement the FATF Standards.

\*\*\*\*\*

*24 February 2023* - One year after the Russian Federation's illegal, unprovoked and unjustified full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, the FATF reiterates its deepest sympathies for the people of Ukraine and continues to deplore the huge loss of lives and malicious destruction caused by the Russia Federation's ongoing brutal attack on Ukraine. The FATF acknowledges the United Nations General Assembly Resolution ES-11/1 which demands that the Russian Federation immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders.

The FATF strongly condemns the Russian Federation's war of aggression against Ukraine. Over the past year, the Russian Federation has intensified its inhumane and brutal attacks targeting critical public infrastructure. The FATF is also deeply concerned by the reports of arms trade between the Russian Federation and United Nations sanctioned jurisdictions, and malicious cyber-activities emanating from Russia.

The Russian Federation's actions unacceptably run counter to the FATF core principles aiming to promote security, safety, and the integrity of the global financial system. They also represent a gross violation of the commitment to international cooperation and mutual respect upon which FATF Members have agreed to implement and support the FATF Standards. Considering the above, the FATF has decided to suspend the membership of the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation remains accountable for its obligation to implement the FATF Standards. The Russian Federation must continue to meet its financial obligations. The Russian Federation will remain a member of the Global

Network as an active member of the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering (EAG) and retain its rights as an EAG member. The FATF will monitor the situation and consider at each of its Plenary meetings whether the grounds exist for lifting or modifying these restrictions.

The FATF continues to call upon all jurisdictions to remain vigilant of threats to the integrity, safety and security of the international financial system arising from the Russian Federation's war against Ukraine. The FATF reiterates that all jurisdictions should be alert to possible emerging risks from the circumvention of measures taken in order to protect the international financial system and take the necessary measures to mitigate these risks.

The FATF again expresses its sympathies to the people of Ukraine, who have borne a terrible burden at the hands of the Russian Federation's war of aggression. The FATF reflects the thoughts of the entire international community in hoping that this is the year that returns them to safety, peace, and prosperity

[FATF Statement on the Russian Federation, February 2023](#)

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## ENCLOSURE 4: FATF Public Statements (February 13, 2026)

The FATF Public Statement on High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action dated February 13, 2026 (<https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/Call-for-action-february-2026.html>), the FATF Public Statement on Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring dated February 13, 2026 (<https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-february-2026.html>) and the FATF Public Statements on the Russian Federation dated February 23, 2024 and February 24, 2023 (<https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/fatf-gafi/en/publications/Fatfgeneral/fatf-statement-russian-federation-feb-2024.html>) relate to FATF Recommendation 19 and articles 11 and 13 of the State Ordinance for the Prevention and Combating of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (AML/CFT State Ordinance) where they identify countries that fall into the following five categories:

### **A. FATF Public Statement on High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action**

#### Category One

The DPRK falls into this category. The FATF reaffirms its call on its members and urges all jurisdictions to robustly implement the targeted financial sanctions in accordance with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions and apply countermeasures to protect their financial systems from money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing threat emanating from DPRK. Jurisdictions are called upon to take necessary countermeasures by closing any existing branches or subsidiaries of DPRK banks within their territories, terminating correspondent relations with DPRK banks, and limiting business relations and financial transactions with DPRK persons. Despite these FATF calls, DPRK has increased its connectivity with the international financial system, which raises proliferation financing risks. Given that DPRK frequently utilizes front and shell companies, joint ventures, as well as complex, opaque ownership structures for the purpose of violating sanctions, FATF calls on its members and all countries to apply enhanced due diligence to the DPRK and its ability to facilitate transactions on its behalf.

Furthermore, the FATF also urges countries to adequately assess and account for the increased proliferation financing risk with the greater financial connectivity reported. The FATF will monitor the measures to comply with DPRK targeted financial sanctions and the implementation of countermeasures against DPRK.

#### Category Two

Iran falls into this category. The FATF calls upon its member and urges all jurisdictions to require increased supervisory examination for branches and subsidiaries of financial institutions based in Iran, introduce enhanced relevant reporting mechanisms or systematic reporting of financial institutions, and require increased external audit requirements for financial groups with respect to any of their branches and subsidiaries located in Iran. Given Iran's continued failure to enact the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Convention) and United Nations Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism () in line with the FATF Standards, the FATF calls on its members and urges all jurisdictions to apply broader and more effective countermeasures on Iran. These measures include, inter alia, refusing the establishment of subsidiaries or branches of Iranian financial institutions and virtual asset service providers (VASPs); limiting business relationships or financial transactions, as well as virtual asset transactions with Iran; and prohibiting financial institutions and VASPs from establishing new correspondent relationships. The FATF remains concerned with the terrorist financing risk emanating from Iran and the threat this poses to the international financial system.





### Category Three

**Myanmar** falls into this category. Taking into consideration Myanmar's continued lack of progress and the majority of its action items still not addressed, the FATF calls on members and other jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence measures proportionate to the risk arising from the jurisdiction by increasing the degree and nature of monitoring of the business relationship in order to determine whether those transactions or activities appear unusual or suspicious. When applying enhanced due diligence measures, countries should ensure that flows of funds for humanitarian assistance, legitimate NPO's activity and remittances are neither disrupted nor discouraged.

## **B. FATF Public Statement on Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring**

### Category Four

The following countries fall into this category: **Algeria, Angola, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Monaco, Namibia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, South Sudan, Syria, Venezuela, Vietnam, Virgin Islands (UK), and Yemen.** This FATF Public Statement outlines the specific areas of strategic deficiencies in the mentioned countries' AML/CFT regimes, and requests member jurisdictions to consider the information in the document.

## **C. FATF Public Statements on the Russian Federation**

### Category Five

In light of the Russian Federation's unprovoked war against Ukraine, the FATF continues to call upon all jurisdictions to remain vigilant of threats to the integrity, safety and security of the international financial system (e.g., inter alia, growing financial connectivity of Russian Federation with countries subject to FATF countermeasures, risks of proliferation financing, as well as malicious cyber activities and ransomware attacks), arising from the Russian Federation's war against Ukraine. Furthermore, all jurisdictions should be alert of current and emerging risks from the circumvention of measures taken against the Russian Federation in order to protect the international financial system.

## **D. Required actions**

The purpose of this letter is to ensure that senior management of all regulated entities and designated non-financial businesses and professions is informed of these important issues. The CBA requests that senior management emphasize the importance of this communication to its compliance officer and inform its management team of the risks associated with conducting business involving these jurisdictions.

In addition to this important awareness raising, the CBA requires that **all regulated entities take the following specific actions** with regard to the following five categories of FATF listed countries:



Category One Action – the CBA requires all regulated financial entities and designated non-financial businesses and professions to:

- a) Conduct review of their client base on an ongoing basis to identify relationships or transactions with any connection to the Category One country.
- b) Report such relationships or transactions to the CBA immediately.**
- c) Any relationship or transaction found must be rated ultra-high risk and may only be continued if the regulated entity is satisfied it can monitor and mitigate the risks associated with such business. If the regulated entity is not satisfied, the relationship must be exited.
- d) Document its risk assessment and monitoring/mitigation strategy and have this document available should the CBA request to evaluate it.
- e) Record the progress of compliance with this action (or otherwise) in the board minutes.

All regulated financial entities and designated non-financial businesses and professions are required to strictly comply with aforementioned instructions. The CBA will verify during its supervisory (on-site/off-site) examinations whether this has been adequately executed. Note in this respect that non-compliance will be treated very seriously.

Categories Two and Three Action – the CBA requires all regulated financial entities and designated non-financial businesses and professions to:

- a) Review their client base to identify relationships or transactions with any connection to the Category Two and Three countries by March 23, 2026.**
- b) Any relationship or transaction found must be rated at least high risk, taking this new or other information held into account.
- c) Document its risk assessment and monitoring/mitigation strategy and have the document available should the CBA request to evaluate it.
- d) Record the progress of compliance with this action (or otherwise) in the board minutes.

**DEADLINE:** Please conclude the review of your client base by **March 23, 2026**. It is not necessary to send the results of your findings to the CBA. However, supervisory (on-site/off-site) examinations conducted by the CBA are likely to verify whether the work has been carried out within the stipulated timeframe. Non-compliance will be treated seriously.

Category Four Action – the CBA requires all regulated entities and designated non-financial businesses and professions to:

- a) Review their client base to identify relationships or transactions with any connection to the Category Four countries by April 17, 2026.**
- b) Re-evaluate its risk assessment of the relationship, taking this new and any other information held into account.
- c) Document its risk assessment and monitoring/mitigation strategy and have the document available should the CBA request to evaluate it.
- d) Record the progress of compliance with this action (or otherwise) in the board minutes.

**DEADLINE:** Please conclude the review of your client base by **April 17, 2026**. It is not necessary to send the results of your findings to the CBA. However, supervisory (on-site/off-site) examinations conducted by the CBA are likely to verify whether the work has been carried out within the stipulated timeframe. Non-compliance will be treated seriously.



Category Five Action – the CBA requires all regulated financial entities and designated non-financial businesses and professions to:

- a) **Review their client base to identify relationships or transactions with any connection to the Category Five country by March 23, 2026.**
- b) Re-evaluate its risk assessment of the relationship, taking this new and any other information held into account.
- c) Document its risk assessment and monitoring/mitigation strategy and have the document available should the CBA request to evaluate it.
- d) Record the progress of compliance with this action (or otherwise) in the board minutes.
- e) Freeze funds or other assets to clients (including UBOs) placed on the UN or EU sanctions lists without delay and do not provide any further services to such clients.
- f) Immediately inform the CBA of any funds or other assets that have been frozen and report the same to the Financial Intelligence Unit Aruba (FIU-Aruba).

**DEADLINE:** Please conclude the review of your client base by **March 23, 2026**. It is not necessary to send the results of your findings to the CBA. However, supervisory (on-site/off-site) examinations conducted by the CBA are likely to verify whether the work has been carried out within the stipulated timeframe. Non-compliance will be treated seriously.

## **ENCLOSURE 5: Regulatory framework**

Pursuant to article 11 of the AML/CFT State Ordinance, service providers must perform enhanced customer due diligence, if and when a business relationship or a transaction by its nature carries a higher risk of money laundering, terrorist financing or proliferation financing. The enhanced customer due diligence shall be carried out both prior to the business relation being established or the transaction being carried out, as during the business relationship in any case with natural persons, legal persons, trusts, and legal structures that originate from countries or jurisdictions which do not or insufficiently apply the internationally accepted standards for the prevention and combating of money laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation financing, including in the case of complex and unusually large transactions and unusual transaction features that have no apparent economic or legal purpose.

Pursuant to article 13, paragraph 1, subsection a, of the AML/CFT State Ordinance, service providers must perform enhanced customer due diligence, in proportion to the risk, in the case of business relationships and transactions with natural persons, legal persons, corporations, trusts or other legal structures originating from countries or jurisdictions that do not or insufficiently comply with the internationally accepted standards for the prevention and combating of money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing.

Pursuant to article 13, paragraph 1, subsection b, of the AML/CFT State Ordinance, service providers must perform enhanced customer due diligence, in proportion to the risk, in the case of complex and unusually large transactions and unusual transaction features that have no apparent economic or legal purpose.

Pursuant to article 13, paragraph 2, of the AML/CFT State Ordinance, service providers may reasonably suspect that a transaction with a natural person, legal person, corporation, trust or other legal structure originating from a country or jurisdiction as referred to in the first paragraph does not have an apparent economic or legal purpose, or if a transaction referred to in the first paragraph, letter b, should occur, it must investigate the background and the purpose of this transaction and record its findings in writing.

Pursuant to article 13, paragraph 3, of the AML/CFT State Ordinance, the findings, referred to in the second paragraph, must be kept for at least ten (10) years.

Article 13 of the AML/CFT State Ordinance is related to FATF Recommendation 19<sup>1</sup> which states:

“Financial institutions should be required to apply enhanced due diligence measures to business relationships and transactions with natural and legal persons, and financial institutions, from countries for which this is called for by the FATF. The type of enhanced due diligence measures applied should be effective and proportionate to the risks. Countries should be able to apply appropriate countermeasures when called upon to do so by the FATF. Countries should also be able to apply countermeasures independently of any call by the FATF to do so. Such countermeasures should be effective and proportionate to the risks”.

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<sup>1</sup> FATF, International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation (“FATF Recommendations”), Paris, France (as amended in February 2025), available at: [The FATF Recommendations](#).





Furthermore, pursuant to chapter 5, section 5.3, subsection 5.3.2, of the AML/CFT Handbook, it is a regulatory requirement that service providers must treat countries and jurisdictions listed in the FATF Public Statements (circulated by the CBA), which highlight jurisdictions which do not or insufficiently, apply the FATF Recommendations or which are the subject of international countermeasures, as countries and jurisdictions that do not or insufficiently apply the internationally accepted AML/CFT standards.

Pursuant to chapter 6, section 6.1, subsection 6.1.2, of the AML/CFT Handbook, it is a regulatory requirement that service providers must, as part of its ongoing customer due diligence procedures, establish appropriate customer activity and transaction monitoring procedures that scrutinize the activity and transactions of its customers. The monitoring procedures must include those, among others, which provide for the identification and scrutiny of business relationships and transactions connected with jurisdictions which do not or insufficiently comply with the international AML/CFT standards, including but not limited to the FATF Recommendations.

Pursuant to chapter 8, section 8.1, subsection 8.1.2, of the AML/CFT Handbook, it is a regulatory requirement that service providers must keep adequate and orderly records containing the findings of reviews of activity and transactions connected with jurisdictions which do not, or insufficiently, apply the FATF Recommendations for a period of at least ten years from the date the business relationship ends, or, if in relation to an occasional transaction, for at least ten years from the date that the transaction was completed.